

# Non-violent Approaches to Fulani phobia in Ghana

Anab Chrysogonus



## Abstract

*This study explored the subject of the Fulani population social integration in Ghana. It traces the constraining factors to their social integration and makes a case for Fulancentricity and the use of non-violent approaches to addressing ethnic and natural resource conflicts between the Fulani population and other ethnic groups in Ghana. Fulancentricity in this context is about valorizing the strengths and positive attributes of the Fulani population in Ghana. It is about de-stereotyping and de-criminalizing the Fulani ethnic group. It is about giving the Fulani population a visible voice in the political, economic and socio-cultural structures and institutions in Ghana. The study also established the fact that the perennial violent and military approaches to dealing with infractions of the law by Fulanis is a costly enterprise to both the Fulani population and the state which has not resulted in the much needed sustainable peace and security in Ghana. The study argued that given the political dominance of the Fulani ethnic group in other countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea, the continuous criminalization and expulsion of the Fulani population from Ghana could ignite and escalate sub-regional conflicts and other geopolitical contestations and reactions. Additionally, these confrontational approaches could create a fertile ground for radicalization and violent extremism targeted at Ghana. Drawing on three case studies, the Wungu Fulani chieftaincy social inclusion model, Heifer International Fulani economic empowerment model and the RAINS Local Governance Fulani inclusion model, the study demonstrated the power of non-violent approaches in ensuring peace co-existence and mutually beneficial relations between the Fulani population and other ethnic groups in Ghana. Key conceptual, contextual and theoretical propositions that anchored the research included social integration, cultural assimilation, conflict and Afrocentric theory.*

**Key word:** Social integration, Cultural Assimilation, Conflict, Afrocentric theory, Fulani phobia

## **Introduction**

The Fulani population (Peul in French and Fula in Portuguese) remains the largest nomadic pastoralist group in the world. They are an ethnic group of people spread over many countries, predominantly in West Africa, but found also in Central Africa and Sudan in North Eastern Africa. The countries in Africa where they are present include Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and Sudan. In Guinea they are the largest single group, representing 40% of the population, the Malinke 30%, Soussou 20% and smaller ethnic groups 10%. In recent times many West African leaders have come from Fulani descent including the President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari; the President of Senegal, Macky Sall; the President of Gambia, Adama Barrow; the Vice President of Sierra Leone, Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh; and the Prime Minister of Mali, Boubou Cisse. Their representation even up to the presidency shows how influential the Fulani ethnic group is in the geopolitics of the West African sub-region (Tonah,2009).

The presence of the Fulani in Ghana dates back to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when they migrated to the country due to better pasturing opportunities for their cattle as compared to their drier Sahelian homelands. They initially settled in the northern regions of Ghana but are now found in all regions of the country having penetrated deep into the coastal savannah during the 1930s and 40s and in the forest region during the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Tonah,2005). Many second and third generation Fulanis were born and bred in Ghana and consider themselves as Ghanaian Fulani. Many of them speak the dominant dialects of their communities and have spouses who were born in Ghana or are indigenes. They have an unalloyed loyalty to Ghana with no or limited engagements with their original countries of origin. In spite of their existence in Ghana for close to a century, the history of the social integration of the Fulani into the educational, local governance, traditional governance, economic and social systems of Ghana remain a chequered one. On one hand are genuine attempts at integrating the Fulani. A case in point being the Wungu Chieftdom in the West Mamprusi Municipality of Ghana, where they have been accorded some modicum of recognition and inclusion in the traditional leadership system. There is also the case of the economic empowerment model of Heifer International, an international NGO in Ghana, which mainstreams the Fulani population in the selection criteria for their livestock improvement programmes. Another interesting case of social inclusion of the Fulani is the RAINS local governance model where the civil society organisation tries to create spaces for the participation of the Fulani in the local governance system in their respective Districts in Ghana. On the flip side, the social integration of the Fulanis in Ghana has been marked by hostilities, resistance and indignation, unfortunately in some cases even state sponsored. The Ghanaian government has had on a number of counter less occasions marshalled its security might and apparatus to expel Fulanis from communities in Ghana for alleged acts of destruction of farmlands.


The general disposition of the average Ghanaian, local authorities and national government is one of agitation, resistance and aggression against the Fulani population in Ghana. These Fulani phobic and socially exclusive tendencies are against the backdrop that the Fulanis in Ghana, do contribute to the local and national economy of the country in several ways. They pay taxes on their cattle to local assemblies, they supply the Ghanaian market with beef, milk and other dairy products, Ghanaians benefit from their knowledge of herbs in treating a wide spectrum of diseases, they herd cattle and manage ranches of Ghanaian elites in the urban centres, they serve as labour in cocoa farms and mines and as security men, they are into private business employing indigenous Ghanaians and yet others are serving in the civil and public service. These hostilities against the Fulani population are going on in spite of Ghana signing and ratifying a number of ECOWAS, African Union and United Nations treaties, protocols and conventions. These include, the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol of 1998/2003 which allows for herders to move across borders in search of pasture upon fulfilling conditions laid down in the Protocol, ECOWAS Protocol A/P1/5/79 relating to free movements of persons, residence and establishment ratified by Ghana on 8<sup>th</sup> May, 1980; the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights ratified on 24<sup>th</sup> January, 1989; the African Union Convention on cross border cooperation accentuated to on 4<sup>th</sup> July, 2017; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families signed on 7<sup>th</sup> September, 2000 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All of Racial Discrimination ratified in 2000. Ghana has equally endorsed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implying it supports the spirit and letter of SDG 16 which calls on states to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”.

A worrying concern is the fact that state sponsored aggression against the Fulani ethnic group has geo-political consequences. These include exposure to violent extremism and terrorists’ attacks and possible retaliatory expulsion of Ghanaians from Fulani dominated countries like Nigeria, Guinea and Burkina Faso, and other cross border reprisals. There is no denying the fact that, some Fulani cattle herding activities have resulted in the destruction of farm lands fueling the perennial Fulani pastoralists-farmers clashes which have to be addressed frontally. It is obviously true that some people from the Fulanis extraction just like people from other ethnic groups in Ghana have been involved in rape, armed robbery and cattle rustling. As observed by Awedoba (2007) most forms of stereotyping are fallacious because no ethnic group has the monopoly of virtue or vice. At best stereotyping merely serve as self-justification and self-righteousness. But the multi-dollar question of interest in this piece of research work is whether the state sponsored militarization, demonization and stereotyping of the Fulanis are the only options available for creating sustainable peace between the Fulani herders and farmers and other community members or whether there are possible non-violent approaches to solving these problems sustainably, whilst contributing to the bigger goal of Fulani social integration in Ghana.

### **Statement of the Problem**

The Fulani population still remains a socially excluded group in Ghana. Views in Ghana on how to deal with the Fulani population are wide and varied. These viewpoints can be classified under three schools of thought, the radical (militant), selective (mid-liners) and inclusive (assimilationists) or social inclusion schools of thought. Largely, attempts at fully integrating the pastoral and sedentary Fulanis have been frustrated with criminalization and constant negativity

of the entire Fulani community in Ghana. This is because the actualization of the desired model for the Fulani social integration which involves two dimensions is yet to take place. First, the Fulani group must be willing to be integrated and second, the host community must also be willing to accept and integrate the Fulani population. As noted by Jeannotte (2003), social cohesion is based on the willingness of individuals to cooperate and work together at all levels of society to achieve collective goals. This is shown in Figure 1. The process of social integration also needs to be supported by central government, local authorities, civil society, the Fulani leadership, traditional authorities, religious leaders and other community and national interest groups. These pre-requisites are very much at their infant stage in Ghana.



**Figure 1: Fulani social integration pre-requisites**

Author construct, 2019.

There is currently no national agenda for integrating the Fulani in Ghana. This can be buttressed with the following ensuing arguments. First, the state continues to use militarized and violent approaches for dealing with the Fulani herders-farmers conflicts in Ghana rather than available non-violent approaches, such as dialoguing, mediation, prosecution and compensation. This has been under several military jargons such as “Operation Cow Leg” in 1988 and “Operation Cow Leg II” in 1999. Second, there is no deliberate policy by government directing the Ghana Statistical Service to include the Fulani population in national censuses. Besides the 1960 population census all the post-colonial censuses in Ghana did not find it expedient to include the Fulani as a separate ethnic group in Ghana. They were captured under the “other ethnic groups” category. This makes it difficult to know the number and settlement patterns of the Fulani population in Ghana and include them in the planning and resource allocation plans at the central and local authority levels. The much advertised excuse that many Fulanis are in rural and inaccessible areas which makes it impossible to include them in censuses is no longer tenable. This is because in this 21<sup>st</sup> technology driven century, drones and other technologies can be deployed for the enumeration of Fulanis both in the urban and rural areas. Third, the Fulani community continue to suffer from an avalanche of stereotypes, prejudices and indignities. The Fulanis are criminalized by the average Ghanaian as being rapists, murders, armed robbers, destroyers of food crops, flora and fauna, polluters of water bodies, cattle rustlers, brandishing of danger weapons such as knives and guns in communities and invocation of mystical powers to cast spells on adversaries in communities which create a general sense of fear and panic. These stereotypes and invectives are poured on all categories of Fulanis whether educated or uneducated, rural or urban based and fueled by an ethnically biased Ghanaian

media. Fourth, the Fulanis are socially excluded from the traditional and local governance systems in Ghana. They are viewed as non-Ghanaians, foreigners or aliens with no rights to representation and leadership in the traditional and local governance structures in Ghana. Fifth, their culture is forced to go underground and is being subsumed by the so called dominant cultures. It is therefore not surprising to hear nomenclatures like “Mamprusi Fulani”, “Dagomba Fulani”, “Ashanti Fulani” “Ewe Fulani” and “Ga Fulani” to drum home the fact that the Fulani culture and identity need to be anchored on a dominant indigenous ethnic group in Ghana. This is a clear case of cultural and ethnic subjugation. Sixth, there is no recognition of the heterogeneous nature of the Fulani population in Ghana as shown in Table 1. They are erroneously deemed to be a homogenous ethnic group with the underlying identity variables being adherence of the Islamic religion, engaging in cattle herding and speaking a common Fulfulde language. This could best be described as the Fulani homogeneity error. The lack of recognition of the Fulani social stratified system in Ghana implies all Fulanis are either good or bad, productive or counterproductive in Ghana. Social stratification helps nations and communities to value the expertise and contributions of the various categories and also address their peculiar needs in societies.

**Table 1. Typology of Fulani Social stratification in Ghana**

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Classification</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Nationality</b>	Ghanaian Fulani	Second and third generation Fulanis born and bred in Ghana
	Non-Ghanaian Fulani	First generation Fulanis and new Fulani migrants to Ghana
<b>Settlement</b>	Rural Fulani	Lives at outskirts of communities
	Urban Fulani	Resides in towns and cities e.g Accra, Kumasi etc
<b>Education</b>	Educated Fulani	Formally educated in Ghana. Speaks and writes in English
	Uneducated Fulani	No formal education. Speaks ‘broken’ English
<b>Geographic zone</b>	Northern Fulani	Resides in one of the five northern regions of Ghana
	Southern Fulani	Resides in either middle and coastal regions of Ghana
<b>Livelihood</b>	Pastoral Fulani	Main occupation is cattle herding. Self-owned or manages cattle of others
	Non-pastoral Fulani	Engages in other businesses e.g trading, farming, public service
<b>Religion</b>	Moslem Fulani	An avowed Moslem and practices the Islamic faith strictly
	Non-Moslem Fulani	Practices other religions strictly or lives a circular life
<b>Language</b>	Monolingual Fulani	Speaks only the mother tongue fluently e.g Fulfulde.
	Bilingual or multi-lingual Fulani	Speaks two or more languages including Hausa, community dialect and English
<b>Employment status</b>	Self-employed Fulani	Manages own businesses
	Employee Fulani	Works for an employer and earns a wage or salary

<b>Visibility</b>	Visible Fulani	Seen, heard and active in the political, public service and private sector spaces
	Invisible Fulani	Concern with bread and butter issues at the family and community level

The above variables determine the level of Fulani social integration in Ghana. Fulanis born and bred in Ghana, formally educated in Ghana and living in an urban setting tend to be more socially integrated than other Fulanis without such characteristics.

The sum of all the above constraining national policies, stereotypes and perceptions against the Fulani has accounted for the social exclusion and low confidence in Ghana. This is the research problem necessitating this research piece of work.

**Research Questions**

Specific questions the research seeks to address are:

1. What is unique about the Wungu chiefdom model for Fulani social integration?
2. How is the Heifer Fulani economic mainstreaming model addressing social integration of the Fulani?
3. How is the RAINS governance model creating spaces for the participation of the Fulani population in the local governance system in Ghana?

**Literature Review**

**Social Integration**

The concept of social integration is central for understanding the experiences of groups in marginalized positions in contemporary societies. Social integration remains a useful framework for fruitful studies of ethnic processes (Beresnevièiûtë,2003). There are obviously many dimensions and strategies for social integration of minorities based on gender, disability, creed, age or ethnicity. But whatever, the focus, social integration invariably requires some form of reforms in some domains of society’s life. These could be legal, institutional and structural reforms as in citizenship, natural resource use, political representation and participation, cultural assimilation and diversity and economic rights. This makes the subject very fluid and context specific.

The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (1995) described social integration as:

... the process of fostering societies that are stable, safe and just and that are based on the promotion and protection of all human rights, as well as on nondiscrimination, tolerance, respect for diversity, equality of opportunity, solidarity, security and participation of all people, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and persons.p.9.

Gleaning from this definition, social integration should aim at social cohesion, inclusivity and expansion of social networks for all people including minorities to have a happy, healthy and productive lives.

According to the UNRISD (1994) there are at least three different ways of understanding the concept of social integration. For some, it is an inclusionary goal, implying equal opportunities and rights for all human beings. In this case, becoming more integrated implies improving life chances. To others, however, increasing integration has a negative connotation, conjuring up the image of an unwanted imposition of uniformity. And, to still others, the term does not necessarily imply either a positive or a negative state. It is simply a way of describing the established patterns of human relations in any given society.

This makes social integration perhaps the broadest and most ambiguous concept which means different things to different people. It also means social integration could help actualize a positive goal of expanding choices, voices and opportunities for people, securing human rights and dignity and security for people. But could also have negative consequences as in forcing minority cultures to go underground and creating paternalistic relations between them and dominant cultures. Cultural diversity is a value to be cherish and should not be compromised under the altar of social integration. Also in this global competitive era, social integration is a resisted concept due to potential competition for jobs, social services, political leadership and natural resources. There is also the notion of social integration being neutral. This implies one pattern of social integration may provide a more prosperous, just or humane context for human beings than another; but it is also possible for one pattern of social integration to be markedly different from another without being either better or worse. In sum the social integration agenda needs to address the question of what to include in social integration and on what terms and conditions.

The UN (2015) in a publication dubbed “peace dialogue” viewed, social integration as a dynamic and structured process in which all members participate in dialogue to achieve and maintain peaceful social relations. Key principles in social integration therefore entails dialoguing, collaborating, fostering cohesion and mutual respect and interests and not force assimilation.

A key question in social integration theory, is whether it can be measured. The measurement of social integration has been an area that has received the attention of social scientists. Vigdor (2008) proposes that social integration be measured by three variables, first, the degree to which immigrants have developed social networks, second, their ability to speak the language which is the lingua franca of the community and third intermarriages. He however, canvassed that social networks which refer to the connection that immigrants build with others in the host society should be rated the highest among the social integration variables.

In the context of the social integration of the Fulanis in Ghana, it is important to note that there are different social classifications, including Ghanaian born or non-Ghanaian born Fulanis, educated or uneducated Fulanis, pastoral or non-pastor Fulanis among other categorization. The Fulani social integration model in Ghana therefore needs to be segmented. It needs to be multi-dimensional, with multi-actor involvement, it requires different domains of reforms including economic, political, social and cultural reforms, it requires the use of human right based

approaches drawing on international, regional and national protocols, conventions and pieces of legislations, it can engender conflicts over jobs, natural resources, social services and cultural identity. This means dialoguing and the use of non-violent approaches are required to ensure peaceful co-existence between the Fulanis and other Ghanaian ethnic groups.

### **Cultural Assimilation**

Spielberger (2004) defined cultural assimilation as a process in which a minority group or culture comes to resemble a dominant group or assume the values, behaviours, and beliefs of another group. This could be as a result of cultural imperialism or forced cultural assimilation, but could be and often is voluntary. James (2017) suggests that cultural assimilation is a dual process involving assimilating to one culture and de-assimilating from one's original group and is also time dependent. Over time language can be learnt, relations among ethnic groups can improve and loyalties to political and traditional leadership can also change. Cultural assimilation is however, a contested concept in theory and practice. There is the argument that there cannot be total assimilation of cultures but at best a "melting pot" of cultures or multiculturalism. UNESCO (2004) supports this line of thought by taking the position that:

1. Each culture has its dignity and value, which must be respected and valued;
2. The diversity of national cultures, their uniqueness and original are an essential basis for human progress and development of world cultures.

Cultural assimilation is also contested on its contribution to the dominant culture. One school of thought suggests cultural assimilation is a disastrous political adventure as is the case in Europe, where majority of Europeans say growing diversity makes their country a worse place to live, and believe that Muslims do not assimilate. Yet others content that cultural assimilation is also an economic issue and promotes economic and civic well-being (Pew, 2016). According to Vigdor (2015), cultural assimilation can be measured base on the following: the socio-economic status of the minority group, as in education, income and occupation, language attainment, intermarriages and settlement patterns. He noted that linguistically, first generation migrants speak their original language, second generation migrants are bilingual or multi-lingual and third generation migrants speak only the dominant lingua franca of the host community. In the case of Ghana many of the second and third generation Fulanis have attained a high level in the cultural assimilation ladder. They are multi-lingual, educated in the Ghanaian education system, were born and bred in Ghana, intermarried with indigenous ethnic groups and are actively involved in the economic, social and political affairs of the country. I however, shudder to say that, the people from the Fulani extraction have been completely assimilated into the Ghanaian society. Irrespective of their level of cultural assimilation, they are still subjected to some forms of stereotyping, stigmatization and suspicion. The levels of stereotyping are obviously not the same for all Fulanis as it depends on their social class.

### **Conflict: ethnic and natural resource**



Conflicts are part and parcel of every society. However, all societies are positively disposed to managing, preventing, mitigating and transforming violent conflicts to ensure peace and security in their communities.

According to Coser (2007), conflict theory seeks to scientifically explain the general contours of conflict in society: how conflict starts and varies, and the effects it brings. The central concerns of conflict theory are the unequal distribution of scarce resources and power. What these resources are might be different for each theorist, but conflict theorists usually work with Weber's three systems of stratification: class, status, and power. Conflict theorists generally see power as the central feature of society, rather than thinking of society as held together by collective agreement concerning a cohesive set of cultural standards, as functionalists do. Where power is located and who uses it (and who doesn't) are thus fundamental to conflict theory. In this way of thinking about things, power isn't necessarily bad: it is a primary factor that guides society and social relations. Conflict to a very large extent is inevitable. Once people have different interests, values and beliefs conflicts will always occur. This view point is supported by USAID (2012) which views conflict as being endemic to human societies. It arises when people hold incompatible needs, interests, desires, and objectives and, thus, it is a natural outcome of the competition for scarce resources that occurs in human societies across the world. It occurs within families, communities, workplaces, nations, regions and, indeed, within individuals. It may be managed constructively or destructively; it is possible to resolve conflicts peacefully, through negotiation and cooperation, as well as violently through force or threat.

Once conflict is a natural occurrence, it has to be analyzed and addressed. Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict (DFID, 2002). The profile or context of the conflict can be political, economic or socio-cultural. This needs to be understood. The causes of conflicts can be structural, marked by long-term underlying factors, that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict. There could also be proximate causes, which are factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes apparently symptomatic of a deeper problem. It is also important to examine the triggers of conflicts, which are those single key acts, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict. People are central when thinking about conflict analysis and constitute the key actors in conflicts. The actors are all those engaged in or being affected by conflict. This includes individuals, groups and institutions contributing to conflict or being affected by it in a positive or negative manner, as well as those engaged in dealing with conflict. Actors differ as to their goals and interests, their positions, capacities to realize their interests, and relationships with other actors. Analyzing the dynamics or trend of the conflict is important to determine whether the conflict is escalating or de-escalating and the windows of opportunity for resolving the conflict.

In the context of the Fulani herdsmen-farmers conflicts in Ghana, the key causes converge around, contestations over access to and control of farmland, pasture, water, trees and rangeland in general (Tonah,2009). Therefore, natural resource conflicts are the major cause of tensions between these two groups. However, they are often interlaced with ethnicity creating a feeling of "we" the indigenous people verse "they" the alien Fulanis. These Fulani herdsmen-farmer conflicts have

been costly to both protagonists. The Fulanis have had their cows killed, settlements burnt down, some killed or maimed and others expelled from their communities in Ghana. The Ghanaian communities and the state have equally suffered similar consequences. Ghanaian farmers' crops have been destroyed and some killed and the state security apparatus has to spend colossal amounts of money to keep the peace. This is why the use of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms based on a sound conflict analysis is a most sustainable option for addressing the specific case of Fulani herdsmen-farmer conflicts and other related conflicts involving the Fulani population and other social groupings in Ghana.

### **Afrocentricity and Afrocentric theory**

Afrocentricity is an approach to the study of world history that focuses on the history of people of recent African descent. It is in some respects a response to global Eurocentric attitudes about African people and their historical contributions; it seeks to correct mistakes and ideas perpetuated by the racist philosophical underpinnings of western academic disciplines about African and people of African descent.

Afrocentric theory therefore represents a body of philosophical thought aimed at restoring Africa's place in the sphere of knowledge production, reconnecting diasporic Africans to the African Homeland, and most importantly, empowering Africans, including those in the diaspora, to challenge efforts by white scholars to denigrate African values, the African personality and African abilities, while prescribing European knowledge systems as a therapy for curing the primitive 'Order' of their 'inadequacies,' which some go so far as to attribute to their genetic legacy (Adeleke, 2015; Dei & Kempf, 2013; George, 2009). Afrocentric theory therefore focuses on the centrality of African interests, values, and perspectives predominate.

Asante, (1998), pointed out that Afrocentric theory seeks to salvage and promote African history and contributions to humankind by "reestablishing the centrality of the ancient Kemetic (Egyptian) civilization and the Nile Valley cultural complex as points of reference for an African perspective in much the same way that Greece and Rome serve as reference points for the European world". The proponents of Afrocentric Theory who include W.E.B DuBois, Molefi Asante, Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah have through their writings and advocacy contributed to the African unity agenda as manifested in the African Union and Pan-African movement and other regional blocs.

Though increasingly Afrocentrism has been criticized on the grounds of being irrelevant in view of the "global village" and "global citizenship" agendas, it stills remains relevant. The African continent continues to me marginalized in the geopolitical space and in the comity of nations. African values, belief systems and cosmovision continues to be undervalued in academia and development practice. Hence the need to keep the African agenda alive.

Drawing from the Afrocentric school of thought is the related concept of Fulancentricity which seeks to give visibility and centrality to the human rights of the Fulani population in Ghana to social inclusion.

## **Methodology**

The study was conducted in three locations in Ghana, the West Mamprusi Municipality, Gushegu Municipality and Tamale Metropolis. The case study approach to research was used. Data collection tools included desk reviews of relevant literature, observation, historical narratives, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Key informant interviews were conducted with a number of respondents including the Programme Managers for Heifer International and RAINS in the Northern Region of Ghana, the secretary and Paramount chief for the Wungu paramountcy, Municipal Coordinating Directors for the West Mamprusi and Gushegu Municipal Assemblies, and Metropolitan Director for the Department of Agriculture for the Tamale Metropolis. The researcher also participated in workshops and community meetings organized by the case study institutions with stakeholders including Fulanis in their communities. Additionally, focus group discussions were held with the Fulani chief for Wungu and his subjects. The data was analysed qualitatively using direct quotations, illustrations and synthesis of data to describe the various social integration models and quantitatively using charts and tables presented under the various case study units.

## **Results and Discussions**

The three non-violent Fulani integration models investigated are presented under their respective headings.

### **1. The Wungu Fulani Chieftaincy social integration model**

#### **Brief profile of the Wungu paramountcy**

Wungu is one of the prominent communities in the Mamprugu Kingdom and located in the West Mamprusi Municipality of Ghana. It has a population of 8,000 people made up of 4,250 males and 3,750 females (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). There are forty (40) Fulani households in Wungu, with a population of five-hundred and forty-five (545) people. The traditional leader of the Wungu community is the Wun-naaba and his chieftaincy title is “Naa Zoori”. The Wungu Paramountcy is ranked fourth after Wulugu/Kpasemkpe, Janga and Kurugu in the chieftaincy hierarchical structure under the Nayiri, the Overlord of Mamprugu. The Wun-naaba is a very powerful paramount chief and has jurisdiction and enskinment powers over forty-one (41) divisional and sub-chiefs. The role of the Wun-naaba is to enskin all the chiefs under his Paramountcy, maintain a link between his people and the Overlord of Mamprugu, the Nayiri and also to superintend over the natural and human resources of Wungu.

#### **Fulani inclusion in the Wungu chieftaincy structure**

The Fulani chief of Wungu known by the traditional title Wungu Fulan-naa is Alhaji Hamidu Musah. He was skinned by the Wun-naaba in 2015 as the first Fulani chief of Wungu and the entire Mamprugu Kingdom. In 2018 he had the endorsement of the Nayiri to become the chief of all Fulanis in Mampruguland. Subsequently many other Fulanis have been enskinned as Fulani chiefs in other communities in the Mamprugu Kingdom including Wulugu, Silinga, Walewale, Logri No. 2, Duu and Kpasemkpe.



**Photograph of enskinment of Wungu Fulani Chief, Fulan-naa, Alhaji Hamidu Musah**

The Wungu chieftaincy model shows that there can be beneficial relations between indigenous ethnic groups and the Fulani population in Ghana. Due to the power imbalance between the dominant ethnic groups and the Fulanis, the social integration of the Fulanis requires the endorsement and support of champions and traditional power brokers like the Wun-naaba to change the existing status quo.

### **Reasons for the integration of the Fulanis into the Wungu chieftaincy system**

The research reviewed a number of reasons for the integration of the Fulani into the Wungu chieftaincy system. The overarching reason for Wun-naaba, Alhaji Sulemana Saaka, Naazoori enskinning a Fulani as a chief in his paramountcy is captured below:

“I enskinned him as a chief of Fulanis because he is honest, truthful and hardworking. He takes care of our cattle and we have never seen or experienced any kind of fault in him, since his infancy. I therefore enskinned him to ensure peaceful co-existence and effective coordination of the Fulani activities under my Paramountcy. It will also make the Fulanis feel part and parcel of our community and not be isolated”

Interview with Wun-naaba, January, 2019

### **Role of Fulan-naa in Wungu chieftaincy model**

The Fulani chief of Wungu has rights and privileges as other chiefs under the Wungu paramountcy. He participates in important meetings in the Wun-naaba’s palace and contributes to the resolution of conflicts involving Fulanis and Mamprusis. Other specific roles are:

- a. To serve as a link between the Wun-naaba’s palace and all the Fulanis under the Wungu paramountcy;
- b. To account for the activities of the Fulanis in the paramountcy and inform the Wun-naaba of newly settled Fulanis in the community;

- c. To lead any Fulani who may have problem(s) with any person/community to the Wun-naaba's palace for resolution;
- d. To inform the Fulani community of development projects and government policies and mobilize them to participate in the local governance system. A case in point was the mobilization of the Fulani population to attend meetings leading to the selection of sites for the *one-village-one-dam* flagship policy of government and their participation in the referendum that created the North-East region of Ghana.

### Impact of the inclusion of Fulani in the Wungu chieftaincy system

Though the Fulani inclusion in the Wungu chieftaincy was only in 2015, the community members and Fulanis themselves reported improved relations between the two groups. The Fulanis now participate actively in communal labour activities in the paramountcy. There has also been a decrease in the number of reported cases on the destruction of crops lands as shown in Table 2. The Fulan-naa indicated that some cases such as cattle rustling and armed robbery were often planned and executed between the two parties. This therefore requires the cooperation of both parties to reduce such nefarious activities in their communities. A key finding from this research was the improved levels of enrolment and attendance of Fulani children in the school system as shown in Figure 2.

**Table 2: Reported or alleged crimes committed by Fulanis in Wungu paramountcy**


Type of crime	Year and Number					
	Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Rape of women</b>	<b>Year</b>	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	<b>No.</b>	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Destruction of farmers farms</b>	<b>Year</b>	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	<b>No.</b>	3	4	2	2	1
<b>Cattle rustling</b>	<b>Year</b>	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	<b>No.</b>	2	2	1	3	4
<b>Armed robbery and banditry</b>	<b>Year</b>	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	<b>No.</b>	0	0	0	3	0
<b>Murder</b>	<b>Year</b>	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	<b>No.</b>	0	0	1 <sup>1</sup>	0	0

**Source: Field data, 2019**

A key reason for the improved participation of the Fulani population in the education system was due to the improved cooperation between the Fulanis and Wungu paramountcy. This has made it possible for a number of Fulani children to be increased in available local government scholarships

<sup>1</sup> A farmer was killed at Yizesi by a Fulani in 2016.

and bursaries for education. Figure 2 shows that 164 Fulani children are in school from the Wungu community from a population of 545 Fulanis.



**Figure: 2 Fulani children in the Wungu community in school**

**2. The Heifer International Fulani economic empowerment Model**

Heifer International (HI) is an international NGO that works in Ghana and other countries in the world. In Ghana Heifer works with small holder farmers to improve food security and their incomes under a project known as Escaping poverty project. The research focused on the Heifer Ghana model of economic empowerment because it was found to be an inclusive model. The key findings are discussed below:

**Project interventions**

The Escape poverty project is implemented in seven communities in two districts in the Northern Region of Ghana. These are Nambagla, Nakpanzoo, Ying, Tindag and Janjorikukuo in Savelugu Municipality and Guno, Kpachelo in the Nanton district of Ghana. The project supports the project beneficiaries in two areas. 1) Crop production, processing and marketing, targeting crops like rice, maize and groundnuts. 2) Small ruminants and poultry rearing. HI supports the beneficiary farmers through training, market linkages and savings mobilization through the formation of Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs).

**Fulani inclusion in the project selection criteria and interventions**

The HI project selection model is largely an objective and inclusive one. All members of the project communities are eligible for inclusion irrespective of ethnicity and gender. The selection is based on a randomized computer selection system which eliminates the usual biases against the Fulani population. The process resulted in the inclusion of 9(8%) Fulanis out of the total of the 120 beneficiaries as shown Table 3.

**Table 3: Number of Fulani beneficiaries involved in Heifer International Project Districts**

Non-Fulani Beneficiaries		Fulani Beneficiaries		
Sex	Number	Sex	Number	Total
Male beneficiaries	60	Male Fulani Beneficiaries	5	65
Female beneficiaries	51	Female Fulani Beneficiaries	4	55
Total	111	Total	9	120

### **Benefits of Heifer International project to the Fulani participants**

The findings show that the inclusion of the Fulanis in the Escaping poverty of HI has benefited them in several respects as summarized from a focus group discussion with the Fulani beneficiaries below:

Many government and NGO projects have come to our communities but we are usually not included because we are Fulanis. So we are happy to be part of the Heifer International project. We have benefited in several ways. We are now members of our community village savings and loans association. We have been supported to register with the National Health Insurance Scheme. We have been given new breeds of goats and sheep and we were taught how to process shea butter for a buyer. We now have another source of income and we participate in community activities. We are certainly happier than before.

Source: Focus group discussion with Fulanis beneficiaries of HI Escaping poverty project, 2018.

It is therefore obvious that the Fulanis are willing and capable of engaging in sedentary activities that can generate income for them apart from their traditional cattle herding business. This management and contributing to the development of the communities.

### **3. The RAINS Fulanis Local governance inclusion Model**

RAINS is a local NGO which seeks to address the issues of marginalization and poverty. One of the intervention strategies of RAINS is to promote gender and social inclusion of minorities in the local governance system.

#### **Objectives of RAINS Local Governance Project**

RAINS with funding and technical support from STAR-Ghana Foundation implemented the Enhancing Social Inclusion and Local Governance (ESILG) project in the Gushegu and West Mamprusi Municipal Assemblies in Ghana. The overarching objective of the ESILG project was to promote the participation of women, the youth, persons with disabilities and Fulanis in the decision making processes of the selected local government authorities. The key strategies

of the project included: training of the local authorities in gender equality and social inclusion (GESI), media advocacy on the inclusion of the Fulanis and other marginalized groups in the local governance system and technical support to the two local authorities to develop gender and social inclusion strategies to guide the operations.


### **Achievements of the RAINS Local governance**

The research showed that, the RAINS model was largely successful. First, the Local Authorities staff were trained in gender and social inclusion. This helped them to identify the gaps in their planning and budgeting systems which excluded the Fulanis, women and persons with disability. Second, with the technical support of RAINS the two Municipalities developed gender and social inclusion strategies which were formally laid and approved by their respective Municipal Assemblies. These strategies identified strategies for mainstreaming the Fulanis, women and persons with disabilities into their planning and budgeting systems. The GESI strategic plans included actions plans with indicators for monitoring and evaluating progress towards social inclusion annually. Third, the two local authorities compiled a register of the leadership of the Fulani communities in their Municipalities. Through the register, the local authorities are now able to invite the Fulanis to participate in meetings and the planning activities of the Municipalities. The usual excuse of where to find the Fulanis for consultation has thus been solved. Fourth, the knowledge of the Fulani population and their right to participation in the local governance system has been enhanced. As part of the project delivery, workshops on the importance, functions and structures of the local governance system of Ghana were organized for key stakeholders in these Municipal Assemblies including representatives of the Fulani communities. This achieved several benefits to the Fulani population. Their understanding of the local governance system improved, their social capital increased through their interaction with key stakeholders of the Municipalities including the District Directors for Education, Health, Social Welfare, Coordinating Directors, Planning Officers and National Health Insurance staff. The RAINS model shows that the inclusion of the Fulani in the work of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies could be enhanced through improvements in accountability structures, and sensitization of the Fulanis and community members on their rights to social inclusion in the functions of the MMDAs.

### **Framework for Fulani social integration**

The review of the three case studies of Fulani social integration in Ghana has unearthed a number of useful pathways for ensuring Fulani social integration. These have been conceptualized into a framework known as the Fulanicentric social integration framework (FSIF) as shown in Figure 2.






**Figure 2: Fulancentric social integration framework**

Fulancentricity is about valorizing the strengths and positive attributes of the Fulani ethnic group. It is about de-stereotyping and de-criminalizing the Fulani ethnic group. It is about giving the Fulani population a visible voice in the political, economic and socio-cultural structures and institutions in Ghana. The Fulancentric social integration framework has three key components. The first component defines five outcomes to achieve to ensure the social inclusion of the Fulani ethnic group in Ghana. These are: **zero stereotypes** (*de-stereotyping*), **respect for human rights** (*humanizing*), **Enhanced social capital** (*socializing*), **Enhanced leadership role** (*integrating*) and **Attained equality status** (*assimilating*). These social inclusion outcomes are quantifiable and measurable. The attainment of the social inclusion outcomes in FISF is iterative and interdependent. The second component of the FSIF is the social inclusion strategies. The strategies include: sensitization, education, advocacy, social capital development, economic empowerment, participation and representation. The third, component is the social inclusion stakeholders. Key actors for the achievement of the FSIF strategies and outcomes include chiefs, community members, Fulani population, local authorities, NGOs and state institutions such as Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice(CHRAJ), National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE), Ghana Police Service to mention but a few. Each of these actors has a central role to play to ensure the social integration of the Fulani population in Ghana. This framework serves as a useful guide for NGOs, Local Authorities, researchers and other development partners interested in non-violent mechanisms for addressing conflicts involving the Fulani population and other ethnic groups in Ghana.

### **Principles for Fulani social inclusion**

The study has also highlighted some principles which are a *sine qua non* for Fulani social integration in Ghana. These are based on non-violent approaches for managing, mitigating, preventing and transforming conflicts involving Fulani and non-Fulani ethnic groups in Ghana. The ten (10) principles emanating from the research are presented in Figure 3 and are self-explanatory.



**Figure 3: Ten non-violent principles for Fulani social integration**

### Conclusions and Recommendations

This study has a number of important conclusions and recommendations for promoting the peaceful co-existence between the Fulani population and non-Fulani population in Ghana. First, the study concluded on the note that, knee-jerk and militarized approaches to the issue of Fulani herders-farmer conflicts and other alleged crimes involving the Fulani population in Ghana are not sustainable, but costly to the Fulani population and the state of Ghana.

Second, the study has shown that there are workable and tested models on the ground in Ghana that can promote the social inclusion of the Fulani population in the local governance, traditional and economic systems in Ghana. These include the Wungu chiefdom model, Heifer International economic empowerment model and the RAINS local governance model.

Third, a key conclusion of the study is that the social inclusion of the Fulani in Ghana requires multiple stakeholder actions involving CSOs, state institutions, traditional authorities, private sector players and other identifiable groups. A key role of the CSOs is to sensitize communities on the human rights of the Fulanis in their communities and to champion the rights of the Fulanis to social services and representation in the local governance system. The Fulani social inclusion in Ghana also requires commitment from state institutions including the Ghana Police Service, Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice(CHRAJ), Social Welfare Department

and local authorities to respect and uphold the rights of the Fulani population to social, political and economic inclusion. Other important institutions such as religious bodies, traditional authorities and private businesses need to treat the Fulanis with dignity and create spaces for them to participate in the religious, cultural, economic and traditional systems and practices in Ghana.

Fourth, the research based on the results of the study has made two significant contributions to the subject of Fulani social inclusion and social integration of minorities in general. First is a practical framework known as Fulancentric Social Inclusion Framework for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating projects, programmes and policies that seek to socially include the Fulanis. Second is a ten non-violent principles model for Fulani social integration. This model provides the needed steps and guidance to state, CSOs and private organisations which seek to champion the social inclusion of the Fulani population in their projects, programmes and initiatives.

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